ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
Ireland, Israel, and Taiwan leveraged FDI to develop a globally competitive ICT industry, providing a powerful example for developing countries that seek to foster structural change towards a more sophisticated industrial economy (Breznitz, 2007) . A growing number of countries, ranging from Costa Rica to Vietnam, are attempting to create their own "Silicon Valley clones" by attracting investments from the leading ICT multinationals (Rosenberg, 2001; Nelson, 2005) .
Attracting FDI is, however, only the first step to create competitive ICT clusters. Unless FDI supports the accumulation of technological capabilities, it may only generate agglomerations of multinational companies that operate in technological enclaves without contributing to local development (Bell, 1984; Lall, 1992; . For example, while multinationals helped Taiwan become an ICT powerhouse (Wade, 2004: pp. 73-155; Breznitz, 2007) , Mexico built a high tech assembly site in Guadalajara where MNCs had little effects on industrial development (Altenburg and Meyer-Stamen, 1999) . Instead, they quickly relocated as cheaper production sites became available, leaving behind unemployment and pollution (Gallagher and Zarsky, 2008: pp. 121-146) . What factors determine the effects of FDI on the development of local technological capabilities in new Silicon Valley clones such as the Costa Rican ICT cluster?
There is a growing body of empirical and theoretical studies that attempt to explain the effects of FDI on industrial development. Some of them address the issue by looking at the policies that different countries adopt to attract foreign investment and foster the accumulation of technological capabilities (Lall, 1992; Breznitz, 2007) . Other scholars focus on the characteristics of investors (MNCs) and the absorptive capacities of local companies (Dunning and Narula, 2000; Chudnovsky et al, 2008; Criscuolo and Narula, 2008) . A third stream of studies take a meso-level, or systemic view of FDI and technological capabilities -their analysis includes not only the main actors involved, MNCs, local companies, government agencies and other organizations, but also the interactions among them (Bell and Albu, 1999; Cassiolato and Lastres, 2000; Figueiredo, 2008) .
Most studies, however, overlook the social context in which both MNCs and local companies are embedded. Scholars of international business and MNCs, for example, provide comprehensive explanations of the nature of FDI by analyzing the strategic motives of MNCs" investment (Dunning and Lundan, 1998, pp. 63-78; Dunning and Narula, 2000; Marin and Bell, 2006; Hobday and Rush, 2007) . They fail to take into account that the directors of MNC subsidiaries are socially embedded economic actors (see for example Shrank, 2003) and that their social contacts affect their access to information, business opportunities, for example whether to look for local suppliers or not. Drawing from the principles of economic sociology (Powell, 1990; Granovetter, 2005) , this paper contributes to the debate by showing that the social ties of MNC directors and local entrepreneurs affect local firms" acquisition of new technology and skills in ways that are often not captured by studies that focus only on economic or political variables.
The process through which local organizations acquire technological capabilities is gradual and cumulative. It involves organizations, but also the people who lead them, who often act as bridges for knowledge to flow across the organizational barriers of MNCs and local companies (Lall, 2003) .
Quantitative analyses of the effects of FDI on technological capabilities may be useful to capture its outcomes, such as the introduction of new products (among others, see Aw, 2002; Caniëls and Romjin, 2003) . They may not consider some dimensions of the phenomenon studied, for example the processes through which local firms acquire technology, which change depending on the company and the type linkages that it may have with MNCs (Figueiredo, 2008) . The paper is structured as follows. First, it briefly describes the Costa Rican ICT cluster. Second, it discusses how the literature on FDI, technological capabilities, and the socially embedded analyses of the ICT industry explains technological learning. Third, it presents primary and secondary evidence of technological learning in the cluster. Fourth, it discusses how other studies of the Costa Rican case explain the outcome. Fifth, it shows how social ties contribute to explain technological learning.
THE COSTA RICAN ICT CLUSTER
In the year 1996 Costa Rica attracted a large investment by Intel, outbidding larger and more established competitors, such as Brazil, Chile and Mexico (Nelson, 2005) . Other 24 MNCs that operate in ICT invested in Costa Rica after the arrival of Intel. In a very short period of time, Costa Rica successfully developed a cluster of MNCs and local firms operating in ICT related activities, located in the Central Valley area (Porter and Ketelhohn, 2002) . By the year 2007 the cluster included also 150 domestic producers of ICT.
ii Source: Elaboration based on interviews and information collected from Camtic
The MNCs of the cluster are both software developers and hardware manufacturers. Costa Rican producers are small firms (75% of them has less than 20 employees, 5% has more than 100 employees, none has more than 150 employees) specialised in the development of software applications for
1 The paper focuses on producers of ICT-related goods and services, ranging from microprocessors to software packages. Providers of ICT-using services, such as call centres have not been included in the definition, although they are often included in the national statistics on the ICT sector.
enterprises and the provision of customised business services, such as programming and data storage (Lopez et al, 2009 (Paus, 2005: pp. 173-200) . The next section introduces the literature on technological learning, before examining how far it has occurred in the Costa Rican case.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Technological learning, the process through which local firms from developing countries accumulate technological capabilities, entails understanding technological trends, identifying sources from which to acquire technology, implementing strategies of technology acquisition and then adopting, internalizing, modifying, recreating and improving the technology absorbed, up to a stage where companies become able to generate their own, specific technological solutions (Hobday, 1994; Bessant et al, 2001) . It is a costly, cumulative and difficult process because technology is not a public good, nor is it easy to access, use, and adjust to local conditions. It is embodied in the machinery, practices and workforce of firms, which jealously protect it from competitors (Lall, 1992; .
technological learning process if there are mechanisms that facilitate the transfer and absorption of technology from MNCs to local organizations (Bell and Albu, 1999; Lall, 2003) . The most common of these mechanisms are direct transfers of technology from MNCs to their buyers and suppliers, indirect spillovers (for example by observing the practices of a MNC a local firm can learn new organizational techniques) and labour turnover (Bell, 1984; Lall, 1992; Kokko, 1994) . There is a rich body of literature discussing the conditions under which technological learning occurs after MNCs invested in a given location.
Dunning, one of founding fathers of international business, underlined that in order to explain the effects of FDI, it is necessary to start from the organizations that carry out FDI, namely, MNCs (Dunning and Lundan, 1998, pp. 295-411) . According to this interpretation, the way in which MNCs invest, the nature of their operations and their sourcing strategies determine technological learning. For example, a MNC that invested for efficiency-seeking reasons in a location where labour is cheap and performs "maquila type"
assembly operations (where most inputs are imported and most outputs exported), is likely to have few connections to the host economy, and hence, a limited impact on technological learning. On the contrary, a MNC subsidiary that invested to exploit local strategic assets, such as sophisticated suppliers, may be more beneficial for local technological learning (Lall and Narula, 2004) .
Evidence from the Guadalajara ICT cluster in Mexico corroborates Dunning"s argument. MNCs invested in efficiency-seeking operations, established few linkages to local actors and after a few years delocated to China to lower their production costs -their contribution to industrial development was very limited, as they crowded out local companies and failed to foster technological learning (Gallagher and Zarsky, 2007: pp. 121-146) .
Several studies of FDI and development explain the effects of FDI on technological learning by looking at the absorptive capacity of the host economy, which is determined by a varied range of factors, such as previous industrialization experience, infrastructure, human capital, and a minimum level of technical and scientific knowledge (see for example Perez and Soete, 1988; Narula and Marin, 2003) . For example, the workforce trained by a MNC may not be able to use its skills if none of the local companies operates in the same industry. This would limit the extent to which labour turnover can facilitate technology diffusion. If the technological distance between MNCs and the host economy is too high, the latter will not be able to offer "complementary assets", preventing the extent to which MNCs create linkages and support the development of technological capabilities (Lall and Narula, 2004) .
Other scholars of industrial development underline that it is government policies that affect absorptive capacity, creating, or failing to create, the conditions under which FDI promotes technological learning (Paus, 2005: 11-45) . The seminal studies of Lall (1992 Lall ( , 2003 (Uzzi, 1996; Shrank, 2003; Granovetter, 2005; Porter et al, 2005 They provided American MNCs with the necessary local knowledge to find suitable partners in the Indian and Taiwanese ICT clusters, whilst also helping the local firms of these clusters acquire access to new business opportunities, clients, and suppliers (Saxenian and Hsu, 2001 ). 
METHODOLOGY -TECHNOLOGICAL LEARNING
As Pietrobelli et al state, "Technological change is neither exogenous nor automatic, but rather it is the result of purposeful activities, in other words of "technological efforts", undertaken by firms" (Pietrobelli et al, 2006: 5) .
Borrowing from the literature on technological capabilities (Bell, 1984; Lall, 1992; Hobday, 1994) , "technological learning", has been conceptualised as the process through which local firms become aware of the need to acquire new technical knowledge, and adopt specific strategies to do so.
"Technological learning" has been used instead of changes in technological capabilities because the objective was to identify technological learning processes and explain how actors" social ties affected them rather than providing a detailed taxonomy of the outcomes of technological learning, such as the introduction of new products and processes.
Bessant et al (2001) developed a methodology to analyze the technological learning curve of firms. They argue that some of the crucial first steps are "technology awareness" and "search" for potential sources from which to acquire it. This research focused on these two aspects of technological learning, collecting qualitative information on Costa Rican ICT entrepreneurs" perception of technology, how important it is for them to be technologically updated, and the strategies they use to acquire technology. Local entrepreneurs were asked to identify the sources from which they acquire technical knowledge, for example publications, MNCs in the cluster, universities, government agencies, sectoral organizations, local clients, or foreign organizations.
This research also collected information on how social ties affect technology awareness and technology acquisition. Social ties have been conceptualised as the personal contacts that local entrepreneurs and the directors of MNC subsidiaries have in the ICT industry, both at the local and transnational level, and which they use as firm-level resources (for example, to acquire information, find business opportunities and request technical advice).
The interviews collected information on social ties by asking the interviewees to identify the people they rely upon when they need information, technical assistance or some advice in their business.
Local entrepreneurs were asked to specify whether they have contacts to The lists of MNCs that invested in Costa Rica were obtained from CINDE, the Costa Rican investment attraction agency, and Procomer, the export promotion agency. These lists were filtered in order to focus only on MNCs that produce ICT goods and services, which in the case of Costa Rica were manufacturers of semi-conductors and related components, providers of databases, operating systems, and services to manage software packages.
The 25 MNCs that complied with these criteria were contacted and interviewed either telephonically or through direct visits to their offices. The MNCs that have linkages with Costa Rican firms were visited a second time to clarify mechanisms through which MNCs facilitate the technological learning of their local partners, for example verifying whether they carry out joint activities, provide technical assistance, and how often they communicate with their local partners.
Representatives of the government, Camtic (the Costa Rican chamber of ICT producers), CINDE (the investment attraction agency) and Costa Rica
Provee (the state agency in charge of facilitating the formation of MNC -local firms" linkages) were also interviewed to collect further information on the cluster. The next section of this study presents the empirical evidence of technological learning in the Costa Rican ICT cluster.
EVIDENCE OF TECHNOLOGICAL LEARNING FROM MNCs
Some of the studies of the Costa Rican ICT cluster argue that Intel is supporting the technological learning of Costa Rica in the ICT sector through the following means. Firstly, it upscaled its investments in Costa Rica, so that it now performs not only assembling and testing, but also advanced R&D operations. Secondly, it cooperates with local universities in the establishment of updated curricula. Thirdly, it is providing training to its suppliers (Rodriguez- Intel and other MNCs train their suppliers. Nonetheless, these training programs have a limited effect on technological learning in the cluster because most local suppliers are firms that provide services unrelated to ICT, such as packaging materials (Paus, 2005, 173-200; Ciravegna and Giuliani, 2006) . Intel carries out its sophisticated R&D operations in a highly secluded lab, with no interactions with local actors (Ciravegna, 2009a) . As a result, these activities have not, so far, contributed to technological learning in the cluster. linkages. There are three types of linkages: product distribution, product adaptation and product development ( Table 2 ). The vast majority of linkages are of the first type, with only six of the second, and one of the third. "Basically we commit to use their technology, they help us use manage it better. If we base all our services only on their technology, they give us discounts, and send us online training courses on how to use it more efficiently.
We do not really work with them. We develop our own applications in house and see them (the MNC) only if we go to a big fair, for example an event when they invite all of their distributors to introduce a new product" When asked why they are in product distribution partnership with MNCs, most companies pointed to the discounts and free training courses they receive ( "The best thing about our relationship is that in order to complete our contract, they (the MNC) had to work with us and let us access at least some of their most strategic technologies. Working with partners of this type (the MNC) allowed us to see how they organise their product development, how they manage their processes…."
vi One of the product adjustment linkages transformed after four years into a product development linkage. In this case the MNC, impressed with the technical capability of its local partner, asked it to develop a new software application for all of its subsidiaries. In order to do so, it invited the founder of the Costa Rican firm to discuss technical issues with its core R&D department at the US headquarters. The MNC provided some of its researchers to the Costa Rican firm so that they could carry out joint research into how to better develop a technological solution that would be adopted by the whole corporate network.
The Costa Rican entrepreneur confirmed that this transformed his company, putting it through severe competitive pressure, but also providing it with access to the MNC technical knowledge and to assistance during the (Altenburg and Meyer-Stamen, 1999 ).
Another factor that may limit technological learning from MNCs is the absence of a supporting "learning system" that facilitates the transmission, diffusion and absorption of knowledge (Ciravegna, 2009a (Paus, 2005: pp. 173-200) .
The different interpretations hereby discussed suggest that several factors limit the potential effects of FDI on technological learning: insufficient incentives for MNCs to source locally, incompatible specialization of the MNCs attracted (mainly hardware manufacturing) with the existing pool of local producers (mainly software developers), technological distance between MNCs and local firms, and lack of a supporting "learning system". The next section presents evidence that the social ties of the actors involved explains aspects of technological learning that other studies of the Costa Rican ICT cluster failed to capture.
6b Social ties and technological learning
When asked about how they acquire technology, local firms point out that personal contacts in the industry are one of their most important sources (see Table 4 ). Their reason for relying on social ties is that they feel that the information that they could access by subscribing to technology research magazines and other formal sources is only occasionally relevant. They point out that these services are tailored to US or first world customers, and as such fail to consider the challenges of operating in developing countries. For example, they often assume a minimum scale of operations that is large by the Costa Rican standards in the ICT sector -the largest domestic company has about 120 employees, and sells less than 20 million US $ of services per year.
The information they acquire from their local and transnational social ties is, they claim, more "filtered", or suited to their needs. "My colleges abroad understand the kind of difficulties we face. When they help us, they do it in a way that is suited to our conditions. There is no technical forum or magazine that can be more useful"
ix
The finding is consistent with the studies of social networks that underline their importance as means to acquire information. Quoting Granovetter: "Much information is subtle, nuanced and difficult to verify, so actors do not believe impersonal sources and instead rely on people they know (Granovetter, 2005: 33) . There are 18 local entrepreneurs who, through previous work experience, studies, or kinship, have social ties with ICT professionals abroad (or transnational social ties), which they use as sources of information and technical advice. Eight of them direct older and larger firms, which employ 100 or more people and have been operational since the late 1990s. The other twelve direct firms that have on average 30 employees and were founded after the year 2000. Notably, entrepreneurs with transnational social ties lead all of the firms involved in product adjustment and product development linkages, and also all the firms that that have linkages to firms located outside of the cluster. In other words, they lead the companies that have the types of linkages with MNCs that provide better opportunities for technological learning. Entrepreneurs with transnational social ties showed to be more worried about the need to acquire technology (Table 5) . One of them clarified how his social ties to professionals operating abroad affected his perception of technological learning:
"Everything is slower here, even in the high technology sector. Products arrive later, competition is less intense. I travel to see my colleagues in Silicon
Valley quite often, and talk to them at least once a week. And I get scared of how fast things move over there. So I try to learn, to understand how they do things over there, and implement it here. Although here there is less competition, sooner or later the trends that you can see now in the US arrive here. And it is better to be ready than to remain technologically backward and then get wiped out by some multinational"
x The quote summarises a common feeling expressed by entrepreneurs who have transnational social ties. They provided evidence that through their transnational social ties they gained additional "technological awareness", which in turn led them to develop specific strategies of technology acquisition. Entrepreneurs who acquire information through their contacts to ICT professionals located outside of the cluster also have a different perception of MNCs. Twelve of them are either already involved in product adjustment and product development linkages, or they are attempting to convince MNCs to hire them. These entrepreneurs explain that their main driver for working with MNCs is precisely to improve their technological, organizational and commercial knowledge (Table 6) . A Costa Rican ICT producer who is negotiating a product adjustment link with a MNC explained:
"This (being in a product adjustment linkage) is not about the money. MNCs are though negotiators. We could get much better deals with large local firms.
But by working with BBB, we can learn. It will be like an intensive course in ICT technology…let"s hope we graduate with a good grade!" xi Three of the entrepreneurs involved in product adaptation admitted to have accepted contracts with MNCs that brought them to almost bankruptcy just to pursue technology acquisition. Despite low financial gains from these relationships, they argued that they were beneficial because, in their words they "learned a lot".
Six of the entrepreneurs with transnational social ties are also linked to foreign firms (not located in the cluster), with whom they develop products and services, and exchange mutual technical assistance.
xii
All of the companies lead by entrepreneurs who have transnational social ties are either trying, or plan to try, to engage MNCs in product adjustment and product development linkages (Table 7) . This shows that the social contacts of local producers, and especially their links to ICT professionals abroad, determine both their technological awareness and the extent to which they attempt to exploit the presence of MNCs in the cluster to pursue technological learning.
The Costa Rican entrepreneurs who do not have transnational social ties, including the founders of three of the top fifteen domestic firms in terms of average sales per year, tend to be less concerned about acquiring new technology and being technologically updated than their peers who do have transnational social ties (Table 5 ). Many of them claim that their main preoccupation is not becoming more innovative or acquiring new technology because these are not necessary to make profits in the markets of Central
America.
An interesting and unexpected finding was local firms" lack of consideration of MNCs as a means to support their technological learning (Table 6) .
Entrepreneurs who lack transnational social ties are less preoccupied with the need to acquire technology. They also consider MNCs as a less relevant potential source of technology than entrepreneurs who do have transnational social ties. As a result, many of them do not approach MNCs to work with them. The local producers without transnational social ties who do work with MNCs do not attempt to establish product adjustment and product development linkages, which have a higher effect on technological learning (Table 7) . They are content to remain product distributors because "learning" from MNCs is not one of their objectives.
The findings illustrate the effects of local entrepreneurs" personal contacts, and in particular their transnational social ties, on their technological awareness, and on the type of relationships they attempt to establish with MNCs, which in turn affects technological learning.
Social ties also affect, albeit to a lesser extent, the strategies of MNCs.
Most MNC directors are expatriates on temporary assignments. They are socially disembedded -they often do not speak Spanish and have very few, if any, contacts with Costa Rican ICT entrepreneurs. The social ties they leverage when they need advice or technical assistance are with other foreign expatriates working in Costa Rica, or with ICT professionals working abroad.
As a result, their understanding of the Costa Rican ICT cluster is limited to the information that is available from formal sources, such as publications and databases, which, at the time of the fieldwork carried out for this study, were incomplete and outdated. Unsurprisingly, MNC directors showed to have a very scarce knowledge of the cluster where they operate, and especially of the local firms.
Part of this lack of understanding of the cluster stems from the fact that, as Paus (2005: pp. 173-200) argues, most MNCs do not need to know about local producers because they can import all of their inputs free of duties.
Nonetheless, information failure also plays a role. For example three MNC directors claimed to have specific mandates from the headquarters to find local partners for product adaptation tasks but argued that lack of reliable information made it difficult to establish these linkages with Costa Rican ICT producers.
Two of them have established linkages with some of the oldest Costa Rican companies, the only ones about which there is reliable information. These two MNC directors argue that their bosses in the US expected them to create a large number of local product adaptation linkages, which they failed to do because they struggle to identify the specialisation and competencies of Costa Rican ICT companies. They concede that there may be several suitable partners in the cluster, and they simply do not know how to find out about them. 
CONCLUSION
The literature on the formation and development of ICT clusters shows that social contacts play an important role in explaining the formation of inter-firm linkages, including the MNC-local firms linkages that foster technological learning (Castilla et all, 2000; Saxenian and Hsu, 2001) . However, most studies of FDI and technological capabilities focus on macro-level political and economic variables, failing to take into account the social context in which FDIdriven technological learning occurs (see for example Aw, 2002; Caniëls and Romijn, 2003; Marin and Bell, 2006; Chudnovsky et al, 2008 This study provides evidence that technological learning in the Costa Rican cluster has been so far hindered by two factors that previous research did not identify. First, the majority of local entrepreneurs lack social ties with professionals abroad: relying on the information available in the cluster, these entrepreneurs perceive technological learning to be less important, and they fail to pursue the acquisition of technology and skills through linkages with MNC subsidiaries. Second, MNC directors are socially disembedded, and hence have less means and incentives to establish linkages that foster technological learning.
The findings of this study underline that in order to fully understand the effects of FDI on industrial development it is necessary to corroborate macroeconomic data with qualitative evidence on the processes through which local organizations acquire technology, including the way in which social ties affect them. They also suggest that technological learning in Silicon Valley clones is related to the extent to which local actors are socially linked to the ICT professionals working in other locations (as argued by Saxenian, 2005 and Ó Riain, 2006) and that MNCs are socially linked to the host economy through the personal contacts of their subsidiary directors.
Becoming a successful Silicon Valley clone means not only attracting
MNCs and developing local competencies, but also linking local actors to the global networks that characterise the ICT industry (Ó Riain, 2006) . Ireland, Israel, India and Taiwan benefitted from the social and cultural links that connected their entrepreneurs, managers and professors to migrant ICT professionals working in the US, which provided access to information and business opportunities (Breznitz, 2007; Ó Riain, 2006; Saxenian and Hsu, 2001; Saxenian, 2005 ii The paper focuses on producers of ICT-related goods and services, ranging from microprocessors to software packages. Providers of ICT-using services, such as call centres have not been included in the definition, although they are often included in the national statistics on the ICT sector.
iii Social embeddedness also play an important role in explaining the emergence of Silicon Valley. The latter, which is the most famous ICT cluster, started as a backward region with contrast to the Boston area, where most high technology research was carried out up to the 1960s. It caught up and surpassed the Boston area thanks to the decisions of a group of individual researchers to establish themselves in California and create the company Fairchild semiconductors. Most of today's semiconductors' MNCs, such as Intel, emerged directly or indirectly from companies created by engineers that worked at Fairchild. Social contacts among them helped creating networks of interlinked companies (including MNCs and start ups) that were functional for the industrial development of Silicon Valley (Sturgeon, 2000) . xii They are the six firms that have transnational social ties who ranked MNC subsidiaries as an important but not the most important source of technology for them (Table 6 , third row, second column).
xiii Interview: Name withheld, director of MNC subsidiary, 15 July 2007.
